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Abstract
North and South Korea share the same political and strategic aim of integration and 
eventual unification of Korea, although they remain divided in their understanding of what 
should be the specific nature of the unified Korea. Both states, in their own ways, use the 
same instruments of unification policy; these are military deterrence, political diplomacy, 
economic cooperation, and humanitarian assistance. Economic cooperation and humanitarian 
assistance provide the main instruments of inter-Korean cooperation, albeit in an unequal 
manner as it is South Korea that provides the major funding for cooperation projects. The 
objective of this paper is to evaluate whether South Korea receives economic or political 
value for money in its expenditure on inter-Korean cooperation. This is not therefore an 
argument about the military and political instruments of the unification strategies of North 
and South but instead remains focused on the nature and modalities of economic 
cooperation. My thesis is that economic instruments are being used for cross-purposes and 
that this should matter to South Korea as it is unwittingly helping North Korea achieve 
aims which it does not share, and, as a logical consequence, weakening its ability to 
achieve its own unification goals. I argue that South Korean means need to be re-calibrated 
with South Korean ends. I also argue that the South Korean unilateral approach to 
economic cooperation, while beneficial in opening up relations with the North, has now 
run its course. A determined complementary strategy of economic and humanitarian 
multilateralism will enable it to pursue its own agenda at the same time as supporting the 
moral imperative, shared by the majority of South Korea’s electorate of every political 
hue, of assisting the impoverished North Korean population in the short-, medium- and 
long-term.
Key Words: economic instruments, development, conditionality, unification goals, 
multilateralism
22  How South Korean Means Support North Korean Ends
North and South Korea share the same political and strategic aim 
of integration and eventual unification of Korea, although they remain 
divided in their understanding of what should be the specific nature of 
the unified Korea. Both states, in their own ways, use the same instru-
ments of unification policy; these are military deterrence, political 
diplomacy, economic cooperation, and humanitarian assistance. Economic 
cooperation and humanitarian assistance provide the main instruments 
of inter-Korean cooperation, albeit in an unequal manner as it is South 
Korea that provides the major funding for cooperation projects. 
The objective of this paper is to evaluate whether South Korea 
receives economic or political value for money in its expenditure on 
inter-Korean cooperation. This is not therefore an argument about the 
military and political instruments of the unification strategies of North 
and South but instead remains focused on the nature and modalities of 
economic cooperation. My thesis is that economic instruments are 
being used for cross-purposes and that this should matter to South 
Korea as it is unwittingly helping North Korea achieve aims which it 
does not share, and, as a logical consequence, weakening its ability to 
achieve its own unification goals.
The paper begins by articulating the different political unification 
objectives and strategies of North and South Korea. I then unpack 
North Korea’s development goal whereby the ends of regime 
maintenance are underpinned by the means of ‘military-led’ politics 
and enclave capitalism economics. I demonstrate how North Korean 
promotes an enclave capitalism whose dominant rationality is 
political not economic and which tries to square the circle of opening 
to foreign capital as well as simultaneously closing to foreign contact. 
I show how the initial means of enclave capitalism have transmuted 
now into the ends of a new North Korean development strategy. In so 
doing I show how South Korean financed instruments of economic 
cooperation have the unintended effect of providing the means for 
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North Korea’s ends. I further show how the North Korean strategy 
designed to achieve the goal of regime maintenance is underpinned by 
a two-level game that seeks long-term financial funding from Japan 
and in the short-term relies on economic assistance from South Korea. 
I outline the aims and philosophy of South Korean economic support 
to the North and summarize the unintended effects of the way in which 
South Korean funded economic cooperation instruments have been 
deployed. I demonstrate how current modalities of inter-Korean 
economic cooperation are therefore structurally biased against the 
achievement of South Korean objectives. 
%JGGFSFOU 1PMJUJDBM 0CKFDUJWFT
The broad goal for North Korea and South Korea is unification 
of the peninsula. Both accept, however, that, in the short- and possibly 
medium-term, two ideologically opposite systems will continue to 
coexist within one country. Only at this rather high level of generality, 
however, do North and South Korean share political objectives. North 
Korea hopes for the eventual dominance of its own system over the 
whole peninsula. South Korea’s political objective appears to be for 
the North to ultimately and peacefully converge with the South around 
a liberal democratic polity. For fear of antagonising the North, South 
Korea is usually careful not to specify concrete political objectives. 
Instead policy goals remain coded as commitments to ‘political 
reform, market economy, and prosperity on the Korean Peninsula.’
Regular editorials in DPRK media make the goal explicit. See as a typical instance, 
‘The reality shows that…. [the DPRK can] bring the anti-imperialist, anti-US 
face-off to a successful conclusion, accomplish the building of a great prosperous 
powerful socialist country and national unification and accelerate the ultimate 
victory of the revolutionary cause of Juche.’ See The Pyongyang Times, Saturday, 
August 2, 1999, p. 2.
 ‘Presidents’ Resolutions,’ Korea Now, January 11, 2003, p. 5.
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North Korean Objectives
Northern decision makers have not made any statements that 
display interest in allowing themselves to be incorporated within a 
pan-Korean democratic polity. There is no evidence whatsoever that 
the unification objective of the North remains anything other that the 
attainment of a political regime for the entire peninsula in which those 
currently holding power in North Korea would continue to play a large 
part in national policy making. The rest of the world, including South 
Korea, may not take these objectives seriously. The North Korean 
government does, however, consider its political objectives realistic. 
North Korean analyzes the contemporary politics in the South as 
being fruitful for a convergence of interest and values between North 
and South as one ‘nation’  possessing joint interests in contra- 
distinction to the United States. These shared values are ‘anti- 
Americanism, independence, and national cooperation.’
North Korea’s policies designed to achieve the outcome of 
unification on its own terms are, in the short-term, the maintenance of 
military deterrence; the continuation of bilateral and multilateral 
diplomacy; the continued eliciting of bilateral humanitarian support 
from China and South Korea; and continued engagement with South 
Korea, again on its own terms. These policies are designed to 
contribute to achieving short-term goals of obtaining economic 
support to stem further socio-economic degradation; to build its 
preferred vision of market socialism as marketization without 
liberalization; and to stave off international isolation and possible 
military intervention from the United States.
Editorial, ‘Make this a year of brilliant victory,’ in Korea Today, No. 3, Juche 93, 
2004, pp. 6-7.
 Ibid., p. 7.
 I have developed this idea of marketization without liberalization as a way to 
understand the DPRK’s economic policies in detail in Hazel Smith, Hungry for 
Peace: International Security, Humanitarian Assistance and Social Change in 
North Korea (Washington, DC: USIP Press, 2005).
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South Korean Objectives
Underpinning South Korea’s ideas of how unification will come 
about is the strong but often unstated premise that institutionalized 
inter-Korean political and economic integration will inevitably lead to 
the South Korean system peacefully prevailing over that of the North. 
This is because of what are seen as the natural, almost gravitational 
pull factors of the comparative advantages of the South Korean 
system, that is, freedom and prosperity. Thus peaceful unification 
through the provision of a ‘good example’ will take place. 
The logic of South Korean engagement with the North seems to 
be that the very process of negotiations will engender confidence- 
building, information-sharing, and increased openness between the 
two sides and consequently between North Korea and the wider 
international community. The policy goal of dialogue as a short-term 
end in itself is predicated on the idea that the socialization of DPRK 
negotiators into global norms and the self-evident South Korean 
intention to prevent war or violent regime change in North Korea will 
eventually lead to increased trust of the South. Such trust will form the 
foundations of a Northern willingness to gradually dismantle 
economic, social, and political obstacles to institutionalized 
integration of the two states. Gradual openness to South Korean ideas 
should gradually lead, given the superiority of the South Korean 
system, to North Koreans freely choosing a unification project based 
on a liberal democracy polity.
The South Korean position seems to assume that once the South 
Korean system is recognized as a better system by sufficient numbers 
of people in the North, then a free choice could be made by key 
decision makers, if not the population as a whole, in favor of gradually 
abandoning the current North Korean system. This is a problematic 
premise given that many of North Korea’s elite have a very realistic 
understanding that their privileges and power would be threatened 
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should North Korea be somehow incorporated into a democratic 
society. They are aware that in South Korea even previous presidents 
have not been immune from justice to the extent that they have been 
tried and imprisoned for wrong-doing. It is also difficult to identify 
any political trends within North Korea that might imply that in the 
future either the population or sectors of the elite could exercise the 
degree of choice in domestic or foreign policy that allow, effectively, 
for the political absorption of the North by the South. Indeed, as I 
demonstrate below, the unintended effects of the current modalities of 
South Korean economic cooperation contribute to achieving the 
rebuilding of the North Korean system in ways that are least 
compatible with South Korean objectives.
/PSUI ,PSFBٗT %FWFMPQNFOU (PBMT
Since the late 1990s North Korea’s domestic development goal 
has been of regime maintenance and is therefore a political, not an 
economic, goal. The strategy is to prevent regime change Gfrom inside 
or out. In pursuit of the strategic goal the government has decreed that 
the entire society should be reconstituted as a military force under the 
leadership of the army. The armed forces, which have law and order 
functions as well as national defence capabilities, are the guarantor of 
regime maintenance. DPRK economic policies are designed to 
support the political reconstitution of the society around the military- 
led development project. 
The economic objectives of building a modern industrial and 
technological capacity and developing an economic system of tightly 
Rodong Sinmun/Kulloja, ‘Invincible is the Workers’ Party of Korea’s high priority 
army politics,’ reprinted in English in Korea Today, No. 10, Juche 88, 1999, pp. 
11-18; For representative statement see ‘Ever-Victorious Sword-High Priority 
Army Politics,’ Korea Today, No. 12, Juche 88, 2004, p. 4.
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controlled market socialism should be understood as functional in 
respect of the primary goal of regime maintenance. The medium-term 
strategy designed to achieve the goal of regime maintenance has 
political and economic strands. It is to consolidate the regime such that 
it can sustain itself without the constant necessity for crisis managementGfor instance by having to rely on the ‘imperialists’ of Japan and the 
United States for food aid to compensate for North Korea’s continued 
substantial and now chronic food deficits.
To a large extent the North Korean government has for the short- 
to medium-term adopted the development strategy of Latin American 
authoritarian regimes of the 1970s and 1980s Galso adopted to prevent 
regime change from below or from outside. Entrepreneurs are allowed 
to flourish provided they keep their distance from the political realm. 
Political controls are retained over the population to control 
dissidence and the army acts as the guarantor of regime stability. The 
new North Korean development project is also similar to that of Cold 
War Latin American authoritarian capitalist regimes in two other 
ways; the embedding of poverty for large swathes of the population 
and the structural support for corruption as a necessary way of doing 
business. There are no plans to revive the extensive social welfare 
system that underpinned the Kim Il Sungist period and at the same 
time we see in North Korea the continued creation of a large class of 
marginalized poor people. Also similarly to Latin America in the 
1970s and 1980s, because of the relative freedom allowed to economic 
entrepreneurs and the necessity for those entrepreneurs to find their 
ways around the restrictive political controls that inhibit opportunities 
to maximize profit, the inevitable results have been growth in the 
FAO, ‘North Korea has bigger harvest but millions still need food aid,’ November 
23, 2004, http://www.fao.org/newsroom/en/news/2004/51607/.
Hazel Smith, Hungry for Peace: International Security, Humanitarian Assistance 
and Social Change in North Korea (Washington, DC: USIP Press, 2005).
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bribery and corruption as a necessary feature of doing business in the 
new DPRK.
5IF 1PMJUJDBM .FBOT " .JMJUBSZMFE 4PDJFUZ
In the mid-1990s, following domestic economic collapse and 
the cut-off of external financial support, up to a million North Koreans 
died of famine. North Korea has never published numbers of famine 
deaths although it openly recognizes the disaster that befell the county 
in its continued references to the period of the ‘arduous march’ after 
the famine in which all North Koreans struggled for survival. In the 
wake of the economic collapse of the 1990s, North Korean reconstituted 
its political objectives around what it terms a ‘military-led’ or 
‘Songun’ system. In this system the entire society is instructed to 
operate as if it were part of a military organization. In this reconstituted 
North Korea ‘all members of the society should model [sic] after the 
traits of soldiers.’ For North Korea the highly valued traits are 
obedience, discipline, and subordination to the leadership. These are 
neither implicit to North Korea’s understanding of what constitutes 
Hazel Smith, Crime and economic instability: The real security threat from North 
Korea and what to do about it, International Relations of the Asia Pacific, Volume 
5, 2005, pp. 235-249; Hazel Smith, The disintegration and reconstitution of the 
state in the DPRK in Simon Chesterman, Michael Ignatieff, and Ramesh Thakur 
(eds.), Making States Work (Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 2005), pp. 
167-192.
For an exhaustive and rigorous analysis of famine deaths in the DPRK in the 1990s 
see Suk Lee, Food Shortages and Economic Institutions in The Democratic 
People’s Republic of Korea, unpublished doctoral thesis, Department of 
Economics, University of Warwick, January 2003.
For example, “Local industry in Kowon county,” Korea Today, No. 10, Juche 88, 
1999, p. 10.
Editorial, ‘Make this a year of brilliant victory,’ in Korea Today, No. 3, Juche 93, 
2004, pp. 4-7.
 Ibid., p. 5.
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necessary features of the reconstituted political system nor marginal 
features. 
In the new era of the ‘military-led’ society ‘working people…  
should put the interests of society and the collective above their own.’ 
The society is rigidly hierarchical and its individual members have no 
rights to individual choice or dissent. This anti-democratic political 
system by definition provides structural restraints to political change Gfor to change to democracy it would have to overturn its own 
principles, norms, and institutions. It is also a system that is by 
definition controlled through the exercise of force and the threat of 
punishment. As in the military, those who do not obey orders are 
punished.
5IF &DPOPNJD .FBOT 5IF 1VSTVJU PG &ODMBWF $BQJUBMJTN
The North Korean government has had a clear policy of 
encouraging foreign investment since the creation of the state in 1948. 
It had imported technology, inputs, and know-how from the former 
communist states and when it could afford it, technology from the 
West. In the 1980s however, the DPRK could not generate sufficient 
export earnings to service its debts and stopped paying its international 
creditors. International lack of creditworthiness combined with the 
end of concessionary support from former communist countries and 
China in the early 1990s resulted in a dramatic downturn in foreign 
investment, precipitating the famine conditions of the early and 
mid-1990s. In 1995, lacking alternative sources of investment other 
For summary of DPRK foreign and economic policy prior to the 1990s see Hazel 
Smith, ‘North Korean Foreign Policy in the 1990s: The Realist Approach,’ in 
Hazel Smith et al. (eds.), North Korea in the New World Order (London and New 
York: Macmillan and St. Martin’s Press, 1996).
For detail on pre-famine economic strategies, post-famine economic strategies, 
and the socio-economic change that too place in the DPRK from the 1990s 
30  How South Korean Means Support North Korean Ends
than from the major capitalist countries and requiring emergency 
inputs to put a halt to deaths from starvation and malnutrition, the 
government turned to the West for economic assistance and humanitarian 
aid. It did so in such a way as to try to minimize the potential political 
impact of large numbers of foreigners doing business in the North. 
One problem for the North Korean government was that its 
educational system and media had drawn a picture of foreign 
countries, especially South Korea, as having an inferior level of social, 
cultural, and economic achievement to that of North Korea. An 
unmediated exposure to large numbers of foreigners, even those who 
did not speak Korean, would have exposed this picture of the outside 
world as false. Large-scale access to alternative sources of information, 
combined with visible long-term immiseration for most of the 
population, could have provided grounds for political unrest. Another 
objective was for the government to gain maximum credit for any 
economic success story such as to help re-build the domestic 
legitimacy of the regime.
A priority therefore was to prevent large numbers of foreigners 
having unimpeded access to the population and perhaps fomenting 
dissent. The North Korean government thus searched for a framework 
for DPRK-capitalist cooperation that could encourage foreign 
investment but at the same time prevent anything other than superficial 
interaction of foreigners with the North Korean population. 
onwards see Hazel Smith, Hungry for Peace: International Security, Humanitarian 
Assistance and Social Change in North Korea (Washington, DC: USIP Press, 
2005).
For details of these negotiations see Hazel Smith, Overcoming Humanitarian 
Dilemmas in the DPRK Special Report No. 90 (Washington, DC: United States 
Institute of Peace, July 2002).
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Developing the Enclave Model
In 1991 the DPRK designated the remote north-eastern region of 
Rajin-Sonbong as a special economic zone in an attempt to encourage 
foreign investment in the region and to promote international trade. In 
the mid-1990s, in the wake of the 1994 Geneva agreement and the 
creation of the multilateral Korean Peninsula Energy Development 
Organization (KEDO), the government designated a fenced-off site in 
the east of the country at Kumho for the building of two light-water 
nuclear reactors. The Kumho light water reactor site was designed to 
provide a hermetically sealed site for state-controlled receipt of 
foreign capital investment and advanced technology, mainly from 
South Korea and Japan.
Rajin-Sonbong was part of the UNDP Tumen River Area 
Development Programme: A regional cooperation zone that also 
included bordering remote areas of China, Russia, and eastern 
Mongolia. Rajin-Sonbong did not attract major foreign investment G
less than one hundred million dollars between 1991 and 2000. It did, 
however, provide a forum in which North Korean senior government 
officials could interact with South Koreans, thus providing one of the 
few arenas of direct dialogue before the great thaw between North and 
South that started in 2000 with the meeting of South Korean President 
Kim Dae Jung and North Korean leader Kim Jong Il.
Reasons for lack of economic success included the lack of 
infrastructure including decent roads and reliable rail transport into 
North Korea and out through China and Russia; poor telecom-
munications; and irregular and inadequate electricity and water 
supplies. Another reason was that possibilities were not available for 
market expansion back into North Korea. The North Korean 
For investment data see Tumen Secretariat, Tumen Update, No. 3, Beijing, 
October 2000, p. 13.
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government deliberately discouraged interlinkage backwards into the 
DPRK society and economy. The inhospitable mountains separating 
Rajin-Sonbong from the rest of the country were seen by the North 
Korean government as a plus not a negative factor in the promotion of 
Rajin-Sonbong as an enclave for capitalist enterprise. Foreigners 
would thus be geographically prevented from contact with the North 
Korean population. The foreigners who visited Rajin-Sonbong, of 
which there were 90,000 in 1999, were kept under close scrutiny with 
South Koreans particularly subject to suspicion.
At Kumho, the North Korean government physically cleared the 
site of the local North Korean population. Only North Korean technicians 
and service workers were permitted to stay on site. Visiting foreign 
technicians and officials were not permitted to leave the site. Uzbeki 
workers brought in by the management organization, the Korean 
Peninsula Development Organization (KEDO) endured conditions 
verging on penal servitude. They were contracted for one year for less 
than $200 a month and were not allowed to leave the Kumho 
construction site, which lacked all but the most basic facilities, during 
the entire year long contract.
Both the Rajin-Sonbong and the Kumho KEDO project provided 
testing grounds for the enclave strategy. The DPRK learned from the 
experiences of Rajin-Sonbong and Kumho that its interlocutors in the 
West would be prepared to accept severe restrictions of freedom of 
movement of foreign staff and visitors; that conditions of labor were 
South Korean academic staff at Yanbian University of Science and Technology, 
in the Yanbian area of China that is also part of the Tumen River special economic 
zone, informed me in 2002 that two of their number had been arrested and 
imprisoned in Rajin-Sonbong after their deliveries if food and goods to children’s 
nurseries had brought them under suspicion of spying.
Uzbeki sources report that Uzbeki workers were paid just $110 a month. See 
http://uzland.freenet.uz/2001/march/19.htm. North Korean workers had been 
paid $110 a month, and when they demanded more money, KEDO refused to pay 
and imported Uzbeki workers who were also paid low wages. The sum of $200 is 
from my interviews with KEDO officials.
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not a priority negotiating objective for foreign investors; and that an 
acceptable modus operandi was to physically segregate foreigners 
from the North Korean population. The North Korean government 
thus adopted this model as the template for inter-Korean economic 
cooperation, which began in the late 1990s with the Hyundai 
sponsored Mount Kumgang tourism project, and was followed by the 
Kaesong joint industrial zone in the early 2000. The North Korean 
government saw the Mount Kumgang project as a way to generate 
millions of dollars of hard currency while the Kaesong project was 
viewed as providing a vehicle through which large-scale capital and 
high-end technology could be transferred. 
North Korea further demonstrated its commitment to the 
enclave strategy in its attempt to push through an international free 
trade zone in Sinuiju on its north-western border with China. The plan 
failed as it did not have the cooperation of the Chinese government. 
Intrinsic to the plan was the non-voluntary relocation of the entire 
population of Sinuiju, some 340,000 people, from their homes to what 
would have been a newly created residential area. What was also 
planned was the building of a wall to prevent anything other than 
minimal contact of the displaced population with foreigners.
The Modalities of SEZ Cooperation
The DPRK considers it has a unilateral political and sovereign 
right to insist on specific modalities of economic cooperation. These 
included the ‘macro-modalities’ of the principles of economic 
cooperation as well as the ‘micro-modalities’ of the procedures of 
See Hazel Smith, Asymmetric nuisance value: The border in China-Democratic 
People’s Republic of Korea relations, in Timothy Hildebrandt (ed.), Uneasy 
Allies: Fifty Years of China-North Korea Relations (Washington, DC: Woodrow 
Wilson Center Asia Program Special Report, September 2003), pp. 18-25.
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inter-Korean economic cooperation. In the South Korean-funded 
economic zones these macro-modalities adhered closely to those 
principles understood by the North Korean government as necessary 
for regime protection. The local North Korean population was 
excluded from both sites except as they were needed as workers. 
South Korean businesses were not given control over the labor they 
employed; and foreigners, whether as tourists to Mount Kumgang or 
employees in Kaesong and Mount Kumgang, faced strict controls in 
terms of their interaction with local counterparts and North Korean 
workers.
Politically driven macro modalities were mirrored by politically 
driven ‘micro-modalities’ that sought to maintain a one-sided control 
over business dealings with the South. These included insisting on 
cash transfers, inadequate accounting procedures, refusal to permit 
productivity-linked wages, one-sided arbitrary decision-making, and 
sideline payments. Such non-transparent methods had been inherited 
from the way in which North Korean business and the government had 
learned to engage in economic cooperation with foreigners in the past: 
North Korean economic strategies have now internalized and 
institutionalized these modalities within SEZ practice. Macro- and 
micro-modalities of inter-Korean cooperation are intrinsically non- 
liberal and, in a liberal capitalist sense, non-economic. 
Lim and Lim argue that South Korean businesses have greater autonomy in labor 
management in Kaesong than in the past. This may be true in relative terms. In 
practical terms, as Lim and Lim acknowledge, all decisions regarding labor 
polices must be negotiated with the ‘representatives of Kaesong SEZ workers’ 
which in the context of North Korea means the North Korean government. See 
Kang-Taeg Lim and Sung-Hoon Lim, Strategies for Development of a North 
Korean Special Economic Zone through Attracting Foreign Investment, Studies 
Series 05-01 (Seoul: Korea Institute for National Unification, 2005), pp. 47-48. 
Lim and Lim’s generally rather optimistic analysis of the potential for SEZs in 
North Korea also notes that one of the problems in Kumgangsan is that ‘more free 
activity to individual tourists’ needs to be permitted, ibid., p. 38.
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North Korea did not confine its attempts to secure funding from 
abroad to promoting special economic zones. The government 
experimented with different modes of economic interaction with the 
outside world from the 1990s onwards; most importantly with the 
international humanitarian organizations and with foreign business. 
These diverse interactions were, except for the experience with the 
humanitarian agencies, politically controllable. Economically, however, 
they proved not to be substantial or viable enough to provide a 
foundation for North Korea’s economic reconstruction.
The Humanitarian Organizations
The government received significant funding from the multilateral 
humanitarian and development organizations, and NGOs, particularly 
the United Nations World Food Programme (WFP). The WFP 
contributed around $300 million dollars of aid a year through the late 
1990s at a time when the DPRK’s export earnings were hardly double 
that amount. This funding came at a political cost to North Korea. The 
World Food Programme, as did all the major agencies, insisted on 
accountability of monies spent in terms of transparent reports back to 
donor governments and of using the principles of efficiency and 
fairness when allocating relief aid. The DPRK government found the 
transparency required of them intrusive and sometime threatening. As 
relations with the United States deteriorated through the 2000s, the 
government increasingly took the view that national security was 
jeopardized by allowing foreigners, even those employed by the 
Hazel Smith, Hungry for Peace: International Security, Humanitarian Assistance 
and Social Change in North Korea (Washington, DC: USIP Press, 2005).
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humanitarian organizations, to travel, observe, and analyze North 
Korean society.
North Korea had managed to find ways to gradually accommodate 
the demands for transparency of the humanitarian organizations up 
until the early 2000s. It had done so reluctantly but because it 
continued to require very large amounts of food, agriculture and 
medical assistance that it could not afford to buy and that could only 
be obtained from multilateral agencies. From the early 2000s, 
however, North Korea became less reliant on multilateral humanitarian 
aid as bilateral aid from China and South Korea flowed into the 
country. Bilateral aid did not require the detailed reporting and 
monitoring that had been a condition of multilateral aid and was 
therefore more attractive to the North Korean government. 
In 2004 the North Korean government announced that it wanted 
the humanitarian agencies to cease operating in the DPRK. The 
rationale was that harvests were improving and the government no 
longer needed humanitarian food assistance but instead wished to 
attract development funding. In fact, DPRK agricultural production 
continued to be so inadequate that without South Korea’s annual 
assistance of substantial amounts of fertilizer and food aid the 
population would again face the starvation of the 1990s. In addition, 
development funding in the sense that ‘development’ is con-
ventionally understood would have required much more intrusive 
socio-economic data collection and analysis than anything that had 
been hitherto undertaken by the humanitarian agencies.
For detailed discussion on the changing nature of DPRK interaction with 
humanitarian organizations see ibid., idem.
Mark E. Manyin, ‘Foreign Assistance to North Korea,’ CRS report (Washington, 
DC: Congressional Research Service, 2005), pp. 24-28, reproduced on http:// 
www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL31785.pdf.
For 2004/2005 cereal deficit predictions see FAO, ‘North Korea has bigger 
harvest but millions still need food aid,’ November 23, 2004, http://www.fao. 
org/newsroom/en/news/2004/51607/.
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Non-South Korean Foreign Business Investment
North Korea encouraged foreign business to invest in the DPRK 
through offering very favorable tax incentives. The various handicaps 
to investment including poor infrastructure and absence of  business- 
oriented socio-economy, however, combined with the intense 
competition from business-friendly China, meant that these ventures 
were not successful in bringing substantial amounts of foreign capital 
or significant technological transfers. The experience of foreign 
business in dealing with North Korean business and government was 
that a political rationality always trumped economic imperatives. This 
resulted among other things with contracts being unilaterally and 
abruptly changed, terminated, or not honored.
Chinese businesses may have had a comparative advantage in 
having experience of working around politicized decision-making in 
economic affairs. They were, to a large extent, border traders from 
Korean speaking areas in China with the additional comparative 
advantage of knowing the Korean language. They also managed to 
find their way around the new North Korean system by relying on cash 
transactions, petty or major corruption and were able to cope with the 
degree of opacity required by North Korean interlocutors. These 
businesses operated at a relatively low level of economic activity, 
however, and by their nature could not bring the quantity of foreign 
capital and advanced technology that the DPRK needed to support its 
There is a favorable report on the success of South Korean business in non-enclave 
North Korean business initiatives in Pyongyang, Nampo, and Sinuiju, in ‘80 
percent post profits in Inter-Korea Trade,’ Korea Now, August 24, 2002. This 
should be contrasted with the more sober assessment of Young-Yoon Kim in 2005 
who reports that 65 percent of South Koran businesses operating in the DPRK 
‘considered that their business... was not going well.’ Young-Yoon Kim, 
Evaluation of South-North Economic Cooperation and Task for Success, Studies 
Series 05-03 (Seoul: Korea Institute for National Unification, 2005), p. 31.
 Information in this paragraph from author’s interviews with Chinese traders based 
in Dandong, China, and Pyongyang, DPRK, 2000-2001.
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re-development model.
Miscellaneous Sources of Capital
The government also received financial transfers from other 
diverse foreign sources. These included over twenty million dollars 
from the United States Department of Defence in the 1990s and 2000s 
in return for access to military teams searching for the remains of those 
missing in action in the Korean War. Other sources of income 
included arms sales. Annual transfers of substantial but undocumented 
sums of hard currency from the London insurance markets with which 
it held policies in respect of natural disasters and harvest failure also 
took place. North Korea has been accused of engaging in criminal 
activities such as currency counterfeiting and drugs production and 
shipments, although there has been little hard evidence to support 
claims that such activities are directly organized by the government.
5IF &ODMBWF .PEFM BT %FWFMPQNFOU &OET
 By the mid-2000s the North Korean government believed it had 
found solutions to its food and economic problems Gmainly through 
the channelling of South Korean resources into meeting its development 
objectives. Firstly, the North Korean government no longer needed to 
submit to the politically uncomfortable processes of openness to the 
Mark E. Manyin, ‘Foreign Assistance to North Korea,’ CRS report (Washington, 
DC: Congressional Research Service, 2005), p. 33, reproduced on http://www. 
fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL31785.pdf.
 Interviews with insurance company assessors in Pyongyang 2001.
The most well-documented incident was the Australian seizure of a North Korean 
ship carrying 50 kilos of heroin that ran aground on a beach I Victoria, Australia 
in 2003. See Alan Boyd, ‘North Korea: Hand in the cookie jar,’ Asia Times, April 
29, 2003, reproduced on http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Korea/ED29Dg01.html.
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humanitarian organizations, as it was more or less assured that the 
basic food needs of the population would be taken care of through 
bilateral and hence unconditional aid from South Korea and China. 
Second, foreign business investment remained welcome but only 
insomuch as it kept to the terms of trade established by the North 
Korean government. Thirdly, North Korea’s decade and a half of 
experience of Special Economic Zones had convinced the government 
that it could attract foreign capitalist investment and expand 
international trade without opening up the rest of the country to 
physically free access to foreigners. Special Economic Zones (SEZ) 
‘North Korean style’ thus evolved as a way to square the circle of 
opening to foreign capital at the same time as closure to foreign 
contact. 
The SEZ strategy did not solve all the governments’ economic 
problems. The government for instance periodically tried to regain 
control over markets, particularly the buying and selling of grains, and 
had not been successful in doing so. The government was less 
concerned about the petty trading mechanisms that had ensured 
survival for most North Koreans since the mid-1990s since the 
government had not been able to provide even basic food rations. It 
was, however, concerned that if private grain traders or more 
productive cooperative farms became rich through their own 
independent participation in the market, this could herald the 
formation of a powerful social group with potential political interests 
separate, even contrary, to that of the government. The government’s 
determination to channel large-scale transfers of capital into the 
controlled and supervised geographically fenced off SEZ sites might, 
however, prevent the growth of political alliances between those 
potentially enfranchised as interlocutors for foreign capital (senior 
military and party officials), the nouveau riche (those that grew 
wealthy from domestic trading), and the better-off farmers. 
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Short-term Economic Results
The largest of the private South Korean investors, Hyundai, has 
not yet made a profit from the Mount Kumgang project. Despite the 
North trumpeting its advantageous labor costs and favorable tax 
policies, nearly two thirds of South Korean investors made a loss in 
their North Korean projects. South Korean business also found that 
overall production costs are cheaper if goods are made in China. 
Projects were abandoned for reasons that included unilateral 
suspension by the North, disputes during the project and lack of 
profitability.
Bradley Babson and Yoon Deok Ryong, in their realistic and not 
unsympathetic treatment of DPRK development strategies, note that 
special economic zones are successful to the extent that they are 
situated in commercially attractive areas; increasing policy 
liberalization and experimentation takes place; and there is increased 
private involvement in the management of such zones. This is 
perhaps to miss the point. North Korea’s purpose in establishing 
special economic zones is not the same as that of conventional liberal 
economic planners. For North Korea, the purpose of SEZ policy is to 
avoid policy liberalization and to reinforce government, not private, 
Young-Yoon Kim, Evaluation of South-North Economic Cooperation and Task 
for Success, Studies Series 05-03 (Seoul: Korea Institute for National Unification, 
2005), p. 32.
 In one survey three out of four South Korean businesses found it was cheaper to 
produce in China than North Korea. See Jong-geun Lee, ‘Research on the 
structure of processing trade between two Koreas,’ M.A. dissertation (Kyungnam 
University, December 2002), used as the basis for a table on ‘Comparison of the 
Production Cost of Processing Trade with North Korea and China’ in Young-Yoon 
Kim, Evaluation of South-North Economic Cooperation and Task for Success, 
Studies Series 05-03 (Seoul: Korea Institute for National Unification, 2005), p. 19.
Op. cit., p. 31.
Bradley Babson and Yoon Deok Ryong, ‘How to finance North Korea’s capital 
requirements for economic recovery,’ in East Asian Review, Vol. 16, No. 2, 
Summer 2004, p. 90, reproduced online at http://www.ieas.or.kr/vol16_2/16_2 _4.pdf.
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control over investments. The lack of short-term economic success is 
therefore not surprising.
Medium- and Long-term Aims
The North Korean government had thus two aims for SEZ 
policy. The first was as part of the means to re-establish control over 
the broader national economy such that capital and technology 
transfers could take place to build the foundations for re-development 
without exposing the North Korean population to the impact of 
uncontrolled information from foreigners. Secondly, Special Economic 
Zones would serve as government-controlled sites for receipts of 
large-scale Japanese capital and technology subsequent to a political 
deal on the nuclear issues being agreed. The SEZ had become much 
more than a singular element of a broader foreign economic strategy 
but instead had become in many ways the economic strategy itself. 
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The DPRK engaged in a number of diplomatic and commercial 
interactions in order to try to find funding for re-development. It was 
successful in gaining large-scale humanitarian assistance from a 
variety of states, international governmental organizations, and non- 
governmental organizations. It was, however, less successful in 
persuading foreign business to invest in any significant sense. It was 
also unable to persuade the major international financial institutions to 
lend substantial amounts and, because it is still a major international 
debt defaulter, it was not able to secure international investment loans 
from private or public sources.
By 2005, the DPRK had accumulated a reasonable knowledge 
of where economic support for its development project might come 
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from and where it might not. It had reluctantly ruled out the European 
countries and the European Commission as a source of inputs. It 
understood that the European concentration on improving human 
rights in the DPRK and preventing nuclear proliferation combined 
with the lack of a hospitable economic climate in the DPRK meant that 
significant sums from Europe were not going to be forthcoming. It 
also realized that despite its rhetoric to the contrary, it was not United 
States sanctions policies that prevented the growth of North Korea’s 
trade and foreign investment inflow. China after all had a wide-open 
(for business) 1,000 mile border with the DPRK. Neither political nor 
human rights prevented the growth of commerce with China. More 
significant obstacles were the appalling transport and communications 
infrastructure; the lack of security for investors; poor quality North 
Korean products; and lack of capital to purchase technology and 
necessary inputs.
North Korea learned from some of the experiences of interaction 
with the outside world to the extent that by the mid-2000s, North 
Korea’s economic strategy evolved as a two-level game. At the 
macro-level, the political negotiations designed to dismantle the 
North’s nuclear weapons capabilities were understood as eventually 
providing a payoff in that a political deal on the nuclear issues would 
be followed by substantial foreign investment. Some funding might 
eventually come from the international financial institutions but 
North Korea was not counting on the World Bank or the IMF in the 
short-term. Instead the DPRK was confident that it would receive 
substantial sums from Japan in the wake of a security deal, probably 
in the region of between 50 to 100 billion dollars. These payments 
would be analogous to those received by South Korea in 1965 and 
Mitsuru Mizuno, ‘Japan’s Development Assistance: Implications on [sic] North 
Korean Development,’ reproduced in The Export-Import Bank of Korea/ 
University of North Korean Studies, International Symposium on North Korean 
Development and International Cooperation, mimeo, Seoul, July 6-7, 2005, p. 18.
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would be designed to settle outstanding claims for restitution and 
compensation for Japanese colonialism and wartime occupation. 
Japan announced that substantial payments will be forthcoming in the 
aftermath of normalization of diplomatic relations with the DPRK, 
including grants, long-term concessional loans, and humanitarian 
assistance. They are unlikely to be conditional on domestic 
economic or political reform.
At the micro-level and in the short-term North Korea’s strategy 
was to increasingly rely on economic assistance from the South 
Korean government and South Korean NGOs; as well as investment 
from South Korean large- and small-scale businesses. South Korean 
trade and investment was not large in South Korean terms, either in 
absolute amounts or in percentage terms of national wealth. By 2003 
total inter-Korean trade amounted to only around three quarters of a 
million dollars, that is a mere 0.09 percent of South Korean GDP and 
nearly a half of this comprised humanitarian assistance to the North. 
From the North Korean perspective however, these financial flows 
from South Korea were large enough to enable the DPRK to support 
a stabilization of the economy, albeit around a low level of economic 
activity. More importantly South Korean investment gave a breathing 
space to the government so it could reconstitute the economy around 
its development project of authoritarian marketization. 
The importance of South Korean economic assistance can be 
demonstrated in trade and investment terms. North Korea had only 
achieved a slight recovery in its export capacity since the 1990s with 
total exports rising from around $650 million dollars in 1998 to around 
one billion dollars in 2003. By 2003, however, South Korea was 
 Ibid, p. 17 of the reproduced paper. No page numbers given for the entire volume.
Young-Yoon Kim, Evaluation of South-North Economic Cooperation and Task 
for Success, Studies Series 05-03 (Seoul: Korea Institute for National Unification, 
2005), pp. 6-7.
 Ibid., p. 6.
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North Korea’s second largest export destination, second only to 
China. China’s trade with South Korea continued to increase in 2004 
while South Korea’s slightly diminished and in absolute terms also 
provide a significant source of financial support for the North Korean 
economy. South Korean economic relations with North Korea are 
significant, however, not just because they are also relatively large but 
because South Korea is a technologically developed, fully capitalist 
and democratic country with which North Korea has hopes of 
eventually uniting. South Korea is a member of the OECD, the club of 
the richest countries in the world, and its methods of economic 
operation are governed by economic regimes that also govern the 
major capitalist countries including the United States and Japan. 
South Korean investment was, crucially for the North, not 
made conditional on economic or political reform, either in macro- 
institutional terms or in terms of micro-business interaction with the 
DPRK. In macro-terms, South Korea did not wait for instance for the 
implementation of judicial or regulatory reform that would have 
ensured more security for the South Korean investor, for instance in 
ensuring that might have ensured that contracts once signed could not 
be arbitrarily changed or cancelled. Neither was South Korean business 
and government investment made conditional on the application of 
international labor and business norms in South Korean-funded 
enterprises. 
South Korean businesses remained unable to hire and fire labor 
nor were they permitted to provide incentives for individual workers 
so as to encourage productivity or, conversely, impose penalties to 
 Ibid., p. 5.
Dae-Kyu Yoon and Moon-Soo Yang, ‘Inter-Korean economic cooperation for 
North Korean Development: Future Challenges and Prospects,’ in The Export- 
Import Bank of Korea/University of North Korean Studies, International 
Symposium on North Korean Development and International Cooperation, 
mimeo, Seoul, July 6-7, 2005, no page numbers given.
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sanction lack of productivity. North Korea also took as much care as 
it could to avoid the free movement of South Korean persons on its 
territory, refusing to allow systematic monitoring for instance of the 
substantial amounts of food and fertilizer aid by South Korean 
agronomists and technical personnel. This means among other 
things that the modalities of multilateral humanitarian assistance that 
were so carefully developed through nearly a decade of tough 
negotiation with the North Korean government and which introduced 
principles of accountability, transparency, and efficiency to North 
Korea along with the aid itself were undermined.
4PVUI ,PSFBO "JNT BOE 1IJMPTPQIZ
The successful visit of President Kim Dae Jung to Pyongyang in 
2000 had opened up hitherto unimagined political, social, and 
economic communication between North and South. The South was 
for the first time able to engage in substantial bilateral relations with 
the North, visually epitomized by the joint entry into the Sidney 
Olympiad opening ceremony in 2000. As the DPRK’s political 
relations became ever more tense with the two Bush Administrations 
in the United States the South found itself increasingly in the position 
of mediator and political conduit between the North and the outside 
world. 
The national ‘we’ feeling engendered by the renewed hope that 
Some of this is hinted at ibid., no page numbers given. I interviewed agronomists 
that accompanied the fertilizer aid to North Korea’s main port of Nampo in 2002 
in Seoul. The South Korean agronomists were not permitted to leave the hotel in 
Nampo or the shipyard area in working hours. They could not visit Pyongyang or 
the farms to which the fertilizer was to be sent.
For details of these negotiations see Hazel Smith, Overcoming Humanitarian 
Dilemmas in the DPRK Special Report No. 90 (Washington, DC: USIP, July 
2002).
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the Korean nation and the increasing disbelief that the North could be 
a military threat given its poverty and economic weakness further 
inclined South Korea to what were for the South paltry amounts of 
economic transfers to the struggling North. Given the relative small 
amount of funds, the consequences of the modalities of economic 
transfers were not either properly understood or, if considered, 
understood as temporary, conjunctural, and easily reversible difficulties.
South Korean policy was to encourage increasing numbers of 
inter-Korean cooperative economic projects while at the same time to 
negotiate for gradual and incremental improvements in the quality of 
those exchanges. South Korean economic and humanitarian support 
was not, however, conditional on improved quality of implementation 
of projects. The South Korean government did not demand for 
instance that South Korean businesses have hire and fire authority 
over local labor. The problems in the quality of cooperation are 
various and include ‘transportation, the payment system, and 
communication system, causing problems in the quality of the 
product.’ Payment is often demanded before the South Korean 
investor even visits the DPRK for the first time and failure to meet due 
delivery dates continues to be a major issue. When goods are 
produced, it is ‘almost impossible’ for South Korean investors to 
control the quality of production as they are not permitted to send 
quality control inspectors into the factories. 
South Korean philosophy was that the process of negotiation 
would of itself lead to improvements and if it did not some incremental 
change in the right direction was better than none at all. The overall 
philosophy Gof South Korean business and of South Korean govern-
Young-Yoon Kim, Evaluation of South-North Economic Cooperation and Task 
for Success, Studies Series 05-03 (Seoul: Korea Institute for National Unification, 
2005), p. 39.
 Ibid., p. 43.
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ments was to accept economic irrationality and lack of profitability in 
inter-Korean cooperation for the greater good of working for national 
unity.
The issue of providing bilateral aid to North Korea was defended 
as less costly for the South Korean government and, because bilateral 
food aid was delivered on concessional loan terms, as encouraging the 
North Koreans to understand that they would have to engage in 
reciprocity and pay back the loans at some point. The last point is 
somewhat disingenuous as nobody seriously expects that the North 
will pay back the food loans. The costliness of the WFP operation is 
no doubt a factor and these costs include payments for the extensive 
monitoring and evaluation exercises that will be foregone if WFP no 
longer works in the DPRK. Another reason for South Korean 
preference for bilateral aid is that the government favors monetization 
of food aid and may hope that the substantial amounts of food aid it 
sends is sold in markets as a way to reinforce the marketization 
processes that it wishes to see grow in the North. One obvious 
problem with this approach is that food aid goes to those that can 
afford it not to those who most need it.
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Kang-Taeg Lim and Sung-Hoon Lim note that North Korean 
SEZs were ‘designed to be of benefit to business but also for 
Chung-In Moon, ‘Why Seoul helps the North,’ International Herald Tribune, 
September 30, 2005, reproduced on http://www.iht.com/articles/2005/09/30/ 
opinion/edmoon.php.
The United States and South Korea monetize food aid as a matter of policy. For 
discussion of the problems see Sophia Murphy and Kathy McAfee, US Food Aid: 
Time to Get it Right (Minneapolis: Institute for Agriculture and Trade policy, 
2005).
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overcoming economic difficulties... as well as constructing a base for 
future economic growth... [the SEZ] is going to have a relationship 
with a capitalist system and play the role of being a test ground for the 
North Korean economy.’ Lim and Lim also argue that the North 
Korean approach to SEZ policy ‘will have an important influence on 
the national economic system.’ These influences may not necessarily 
be as positive as South Korea seems to hope. 
Two million dollars worth of South Korean investment has been 
channelled into geographical enclaves. These sums, while negligible 
in relation to the South Korean economy, are significant for North 
Korea. South Korean investment thus allowed the North to implement 
experimental economic strategies designed to promote tightly 
controlled enclave capitalism. South Korean government policy of 
relatively unconditional investment fitted well with North Korea’s 
approach to economic and political development. It did not disturb 
North Korea’s preferred foreign economic strategy of promoting 
‘enclave capitalism’ that it saw as underpinning the overriding 
development goal of reconstituting the DPRK as a ‘military-led’ 
hierarchically organized society, obedient to the leadership, whose 
primary purpose was regime maintenance. Insofar as the South Korean 
approach to economic cooperation gave credibility, legitimacy, and 
financial support to politically controlled economic projects intrinsic 
to which are the subordination of the individual to the state, it also had 
the inadvertent affect of giving support to the North’s military-first 
policy. 
Kang-Taeg Lim and Sung-Hoon Lim, Strategies for Development of a North 
Korean Special Economic Zone through Attracting Foreign Investment, Studies 
Series 05-01 (Seoul: Korea Institute for National Unification, 2005), p. 20.
 Ibid.
Young-Yoon Kim, Evaluation of South-North Economic Cooperation and Task 
for Success, Studies Series 05-03 (Seoul: Korea Institute for National Unification, 
2005), p. 25.
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Contrary to South Korean hopes, the North Korean government 
did not commit itself to using the inter-Korean economic zones as a 
means to introduce liberal economic principles and practices into the 
DPRK economy much less of using these as a means to allow trickle 
down into the rest of the economy of such principles. Perhaps even 
more worrying for South Korea, South Korean-funded economic 
cooperation within the special economic zones was encouraged 
because it supported the North’s political rationality for the promotion 
of special economic zones as a means to re-establish the ancien 
régime. South Korean-funded economic instruments of inter-Korean 
cooperation have thus contributed to a North Korean development 
goal that is intended to establish the foundations for a unification 
outcome that is very different from that envisaged or desired by South 
Korea.
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Young-Yoon Kim provides a salutary warning when he remarks 
that the ‘North Korean government regards South-North economic 
cooperation as a means to obtain foreign currency and advanced 
technology without the reformation of internal economy system.’ 
This warning perhaps does not go far enough. The fact is that North 
Korea’s internal economic system is being reconstituted but that this 
reconstitution is based on economic principles which are not likely to 
lead to either economic growth or what South Korean decision- 
makers had hoped for, that of political liberalization.
Non-economic modalities of economic exchange have become 
the standard operating procedures (SOPs) of inter-Korean exchange. 
 Ibid., p. 27.
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These SOPs have become institutionalized as the ‘normal’ pattern of 
economic interaction in the SEZs that North Korea expects to use as 
the major vehicle for the receipt of foreign capital and technology. 
This non-economic rationality will be very difficult to alter once it is 
established and underpinned by capital and technology transfers. 
Another difficulty arises because SEZ-based cooperation forms a 
major part of inter-Korean cooperation, which is itself the most 
substantial of North Korean economic links with the West. The 
patterns of cooperation established through the further expansion of 
SEZ-based inter-Korean cooperation will therefore be consequential 
for the way the North Korean government enters into all its foreign 
economic relations.
South Korean hopes to achieve unification through an incremental 
process of economic interaction and dialogue and uses the policy of 
support for SEZs as a way to encourage dialogue with the DPRK for 
the broad objective of ‘promoting reconciliation.’ North Korea’s 
more concrete objective is to use fenced-off investment zones to 
consolidate government control over financial transfers into the 
DPRK. The North’s aim is to re-constitute the ways of doing business 
that were formerly characteristic of the top-down governmental 
economic methods of the pre-1990s. 
I do not argue that it is necessary for South Korea, in order to 
safeguard its own interests and strategic objectives, to abandon what 
has been a politically productive economic engagement strategy. It is 
after all possible that North Korea will not achieve its intended aims, 
however hard it seeks to channel South Korean cooperation in the 
direction it prefers, simply due to the law of unintended affects. North 
Korean society in other words may gradually transform itself in the 
direction preferred by South Korea through a sort of automatic process 
in the direction of liberal capitalism. I do argue, however, that simply 
hoping for transformation is a risky strategy for South Korea, given 
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the determined planning by its counterpart to try to prevent such an 
outcome. 
Instead, I argue, South Korean means need to be re-calibrated 
with South Korean ends. The modalities of economic cooperation 
need to be modified in the light of the significantly large unintended 
and undesirable effects, at least from South Korea’s perspective, of 
current modalities of inter-Korean cooperation. I also argue that the 
South Korean unilateral approach to economic cooperation, while 
beneficial in opening up relations with the North, has now run its 
course. A determined complementary strategy of economic and 
humanitarian multilateralism will enable it to pursue its own agenda at 
the same time as supporting the moral imperative, shared by the 
majority of South Korea’s electorate of every political hue, of 
assisting the impoverished North Korean population in the short-, 
medium-, and long-term.
